The first quarter of 2022 has seen some very interesting cases from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In this edition of case digest, we take a look at summaries of recent decisions from the CJEU from January to March 2022 . These cases cover the following areas: Freedom of the press, Freedom of Movement, Values of the Union, EU Law and National Law, Migration, European Arrest Warrant and Competition.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Case C-302/20 Autorité des marchés financiers
Date: 15 March 2022
Freedom of the press
Facts
A journalist working for a British daily newspaper, on which he regularly published articles relaying market rumours, was fined € 40 000 for publishing two articles about the launch of takeover bids of Hermès (by LVMH) and Maurel & Prom. The publication resulted in a considerable increase in the price of those shares. Shortly before the two articles were published on the Daily Mail website, several residents purchased the respective shares and sold them the next day at a profit.
The Court of Appeal in Paris referred the case to the Court of Justice to determine whether the information disclosed by the journalist was insider information and whether or not there were any exceptions in relation to journalistic activity.
Judgement
According to the Court of Justice, the disclosure by the journalist of inside information relating to the forthcoming publication of an article reporting rumours concerning companies listed on the stock exchange is lawful where it is necessary for the purpose of carrying out a journalistic activity and respects the principle of proportionality
Court of Justice of the European Union (Fifth Chamber)
Case C‑247/20 VI v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs
Date: 10 March 2022
Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
Facts
This case concerned the appellant’s entitlement to reside in the United Kingdom for the periods from 1 May 2006 to 20 August 2006 and from 18 August 2014 to 25 September 2016 and to receive, for these periods, Child Tax Credit and Child Benefit.
The Court of Justice had to clarify two questions:
- Is a child EEA permanent resident required to maintain comprehensive sickness insurance to maintain a right to reside, as s/he would as a self-sufficient person, pursuant to Regulation 4(1) of the [Immigration Regulations 2016]?
- Is the requirement, pursuant to Regulation 4(3)(b) of the [Immigration Regulations 2016] (that comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the United Kingdom is only satisfied for a student or self-sufficient person, with regard to Regulation 16(2)(b)(ii) of the [Immigration Regulations 2016], if such cover extends to both that person and all their relevant family members), illegal under EU law in light of Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 70 of [the judgment of 23 February 2010, Teixeira (C‑480/08, EU:C:2010:83)]?
Judgement
The judgment clarifies that, although the host Member State may, subject to compliance with the principle of proportionality, make affiliation to its public sickness insurance system of an economically inactive Union citizen, residing in its territory on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38, subject to conditions intended to ensure that that citizen does not become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of that Member State, such as the conclusion or maintaining, by that citizen, of comprehensive private sickness insurance enabling the reimbursement to that Member State of the health expenses it has incurred for that citizen’s benefit, or the payment, by that citizen, of a contribution to that Member State’s public sickness insurance system (judgment of 15 July 2021, A (Public health care), C‑535/19, EU:C:2021:595, paragraph 59), the fact remains that, once a Union citizen is affiliated to such a public sickness insurance system in the host Member State, he or she has comprehensive sickness insurance within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b).
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Case C-205/20 Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld
Date: 8 March 2022
Freedom to provide services – Posting of workers
Facts
CONVOI s.r.o., a company established in Slovakia, posted its employees to Niedec Global Appliance Austria GmbH (‘Niedec’), a company established in Fürstenfeld (Austria). On 24 January 2018, the administrative authority of the district of Hartberg-Fürstenfeld (Austria) carried out an inspection with Niedec. By decision of 14 June 2018, that administrative authority ordered the applicant in the main proceedings, in his capacity as representative of CONVOI, to pay a fine in the total amount of € 54 000 for the failure to respect a number of obligations provided for by the LSD‑BG, relating in particular to the availability of wage and social security records.
By decision of 9 October 2018, the referring court sent a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court concerning the compliance of the penalties provided for by the national law in question with EU law and, in particular, with the principle of proportionality.
Judgement
On Posting of workers, The court of Justice stated that national courts must ensure that penalties for non-compliance with administrative obligations are proportionate.
National courts may apply a national system of penalties contrary to the Directive concerning the posting of workers as long as it ensures proportionality of the penalties
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Case C-213/19 European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Date: 8 March 2022
Failure to fulfil obligations to protect the financial interests of the European Union and to counter fraud
Facts
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) developed a risk assessment tool based on EU-wide data risk of extreme undervaluation of imports of textiles and footwear from China by shell companies registered for the sole purpose of giving fraudulent transactions the appearance of legitimacy. According to OLAF, fraudulent imports were increasing significantly in the United Kingdom on account of the inadequate nature of the checks carried out by the United Kingdom customs authorities, encouraging the shift of fraudulent operations from other Member States to the United Kingdom. OLAF made recommendations to the United Kingdom who failed to follow these recommendations
The Commission brought an action for a declaration that the United Kingdom had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU legislation on control and supervision in relation to the recovery of own resources and under EU legislation on customs duty and on VAT
Judgement
The court of Justice held that the United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations in relation to customs control and the availability of EU own resources by failing to adopt the measures necessary to combat fraud with regards to undervalued imports of textiles and footwear from China
The United Kingdom should have taken account of the risk profiles and the types of customs control recommended to it by OLAF and the Commission
The United Kingdom has failed to fulfil its obligations in relation to customs control and the availability of EU own resources by failing to adopt the measures necessary to combat fraud with regards to undervalued imports of textiles and footwear from China The United Kingdom should have taken account of the risk profiles and the types of customs control recommended to it by OLAF and the Commission
Court of Justice of the European Union
Date: 2 March 2022
Judicial statistics 2021
Despite the pandemic, the judicial institution of the European Union has been able to ensure the continuity of its activities in full.
The figures demonstrate a remarkable level of performance by the institution, notwithstanding a new upward trend as regards the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice and the General Court
Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber)
Case C-389/20 TGSS CJ v Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (TGSS)
Date: 24 February 2022
Domestic worker unemployment , Gender Discrimination, Social Insurance
Facts
A domestic worker who is the employee of a natural person has been registered with that special scheme since January 2011. In November 2019, she applied to the Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social (General Social Security Fund, Spain, ‘the TGSS’) to pay contributions in respect of unemployment protection in order to acquire the right to those benefits. The TGSS rejected that application on the grounds that the Spanish legislation expressly prevented her from contributing to that scheme in order to obtain protection from unemployment. The worker then appealed to the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 2 de Vigo (Administrative Court No 2, Vigo, Spain) claiming in essence that the national legislation places domestic workers in a situation of social distress when their employment ends for reasons which are not attributable to themselves. That prevents them from obtaining not only unemployment benefit but also the other types of social assistance which are dependent on entitlement to unemployment benefit having come to an end
In that context, the Spanish court emphasizes that the category of workers in question consists almost exclusively of women, which is why it asks the Court to interpret the directive on equality in matters of social security, in order to determine whether there is indirect discrimination on grounds of sex, which is prohibited by that directive
Judgement
The Court held that legislation excluding domestic workers from unemployment benefit while they are almost exclusively women is contrary to EU law
The exclusion constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of sex as regards access to social security benefits.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Date: 22 February 2022
Case C-430/21 RS Proceedings brought by RS
Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court
Facts
The claimant was the subject of criminal proceedings, at the end of which he was convicted. On 1 April 2020, his wife lodged a criminal complaint alleging, inter alia, offences of abuse of process and abuse of office committed in the course of the abovementioned criminal proceedings by a prosecutor and two judges. On 10 June 2021, the wife brought an action seeking to challenge the excessive duration of the criminal proceedings instituted in response to the abovementioned complaint and also to have that court set a time limit within which the prosecutor dealing with that complaint must deal with the case.
The following questions were referred to the court of Justice
- Does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a provision of national law, such as that contained in Article 148(2) of the Romanian Constitution, as interpreted by the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court, Romania) in Decision No 390/2021, according to which national courts have no jurisdiction to examine the conformity with EU law of a provision of national law that has been found to be constitutional by a decision of the Constitutional Court?
- Does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a provision of national law, such as that contained in Article 99(ș) of Legea nr. 303/2004 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor (Law No 303/2004 on the rules governing judges and prosecutors), which provides for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the application of disciplinary penalties in respect of a judge for failure to comply with a decision of the Constitutional Court, where that judge is called upon to acknowledge the primacy of EU law over the grounds of a decision of the Constitutional Court, that provision of national law depriving him or her of the possibility of applying a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union which he or she regards as taking precedence?
- Does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a national judicial practice which precludes a judge, on pain of incurring disciplinary liability, from applying the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in criminal proceedings in relation to a complaint regarding the reasonable duration of criminal proceedings, governed by Article 4881 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure?
Judgement
The court of Justice held that, EU law precludes a national rule under which national courts have no jurisdiction to examine the conformity with EU law of national legislation which has been held to be constitutional by a judgment of the constitutional court of the Member State
The application of such a rule would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law and the effectiveness of the preliminary-ruling mechanism
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber )
Joined Cases C-562/22 PPU and C-563/21 PPU Openbaar Ministerie
Date: 22 February 2022
Refusal to execute a European arrest warrant
Facts
Two European arrest warrants (‘EAWs’) were issued in April 2021 by Polish courts against two Polish nationals for the purposes, respectively, of executing a custodial sentence and of conducting a criminal prosecution. Since the persons concerned are in the Netherlands and did not consent to their surrender, the Rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam, Netherlands) received requests to execute those EAWs but had doubts concerning its obligation to uphold those requests due to rule of law concerns
The District court asked the Court of Justice whether the two-step examination, enshrined by the Court in the context of a surrender on the basis of the EAWs, under the guarantees of independence and impartiality inherent in the fundamental right to a fair trial, is applicable where the guarantee, also inherent in that fundamental right, of a tribunal previously established by law is at issue
Judgement
The Court of Justice, ruling under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, answered in the affirmative and specified the criteria permitting an executing judicial authority to assess whether there is any risk of breach of the requested person’s fundamental right to a fair trial
Article 1(2) and (3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority called upon to decide on the surrender of a person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued has evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of the judiciary in the issuing Member State, in particular as regards the procedure for the appointment of the members of the judiciary, that authority may refuse to surrender that person
The Court of Justice specifies the criteria permitting an executing judicial authority to assess whether there is any risk of breach of the requested person’s fundamental right to a fair trial.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Case C-483/20 Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides
Date: 22 February 2022
(Family unity – Protection already granted)
Facts
After being granted refugee status in Austria on 1 December 2015, the appellant in the main proceedings moved to Belgium at the beginning of 2016 to join his two daughters, one of whom was a minor. On 14 December 2016, the two daughters were granted subsidiary protection in Belgium. The Belgian State acknowledged that the appellant in the main proceedings had parental responsibility for the minor child, but also that he did not have a right of residence in that State.
On 14 June 2018, the appellant in the main proceedings submitted an application for international protection in Belgium. On 11 February 2019, the CGRA refused that application on the ground that it was inadmissible on the basis of the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 of Article 57(6) of the Law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of foreign nationals, on the ground that the person concerned had already been granted international protection by another Member State.
In that context, the Conseil d’État (Council of State, Belgium) decided to refer questions to the Court of Justice asking whether there were any exceptions to that option.
Judgement
The CJEU noted that Member States are not obliged to verify whether the applicant fulfils the conditions to be satisfied in order to claim international protection under the Qualification Directive where such protection is already provided in another Member State
A Member State may exercise its option to declare an application for international protection inadmissible on the ground that the applicant has already been granted refugee status by another Member State
However, family unity must be maintained where that applicant is the father of a child who is an unaccompanied minor who has been granted subsidiary protection in the first Member State
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Date: 16 February 2022
Judgments in Cases C-156/21 Hungary v Parliament and Council and C-157/21 Poland v Parliament and Council
Measures for the protection of the Union budget
Facts
Hungary and Poland brought legal action against the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in early 2021 against a conditionality mechanism established by Regulation 2092/2020, that ties EU funding to the rule of law. The regulation gave the European Union additional powers to stop the EU funding where there is a lack of judicial autonomy. Poland, together with Hungary, feared losing out on millions of EU funds and asked the CJEU to rule on the legality of the new measure. Poland and Hungary argued that the mechanism does not provide legal certainty, is designed to administer political punishment, and should therefore be annulled.
Judgement
The CJEU ruled against Poland and Hungary. The court stated that mechanism was adopted on an appropriate legal basis, is compatible with the procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU and respects in particular the limits of the powers conferred on the European Union and the principle of legal certainty’
Link to our article on the ruling
Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber)
Case C-788/19 - European Commission v Kingdom of Spain
Date: 27 January 2022
Obligation to provide tax information
Facts
A national legislation required Spanish tax residents to declare their overseas assets or rights by means of a form entitled ‘Form 720. The ECJ had to decide whether this was contrary to EU (European Union) law.
Judgement
The ECJ held that the requirement of Spanish residents to fill out ‘Form 720’ and the consequences thereof for failure to fill out that form leads to differential treatment of Spanish residents and is a violation of the principle of free movement of capital which is a fundamental principle under EU. It limits the ability of Spanish residents to invest in other member states.
The court noted that though on the face of it the legislation ensures the attainment of free movement of capital, on a deeper evaluation it does not:
First, because the legislation does not state a limitation period therefore it undermines the principle of legal certainty despite it enlisting profound consequences for failure to fill ‘Form 720’.
Second, the legislation is of a high punitive nature as it subjects a person who has failed to report their tax obligations to a flat fee and to a proportional fee of 150% of the tax calculated on amounts corresponding to the value of the assets or those rights held overseas. The flat fee and the proportional fee applied in most cases may lead to an increase of the total amount of the sum’s payable by the taxpayer to more than 100% of that taxpayer’s overseas assets or rights. That constitutes a disproportionate interference with the free movement of capital.
Lastly, the Spanish legislation highly punishes mere obligations which are punished lightly under the EU law. The number of fines under the EU law are EUR 5000 per date item or set of data which is missing, incomplete, incorrect, or false, with a minimum of EUR 10 000, and an amount of EUR 100 per date item or set of data declared late or not declared digitally where so required, a minimum of EUR 1 500. While, for Spanish residents, flat-rate fines are applied concurrently with a proportional fine of 150%. The amount required by the Spanish legislation is disproportionate and introduces a disproportionate restriction on the free movement of capital.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Case C-181/20 VYSOČINA WIND a.s. v Česká republika
Date: 25 January 2022
Retroactive effect – Principle of legal certainty
Facts
This case concerned a Czech company operating a solar power plant equipped with photovoltaic panels that were placed on the market after 13 August 2005. In accordance with the obligation laid down by Czech Law No 185/2001 on waste (‘the Law on waste’), it participated in the financing of the costs relating to the management of waste from photovoltaic panels and, for that purpose, paid contributions in the course of 2015 and 2016
The Czech company brought an for damages against the Czech Republic stating that the obligation to pay contributions resulted from an incorrect transposition of Directive 2012/19 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and that the payment of those contributions constituted harm and is contrary to Article 13(1) of the WEEE Directive, which makes producers of electrical and electronic equipment, and not its users, responsible for the financing of the costs relating to the management of waste from equipment placed on the market after 13 August 2005
Judgement
The Court of Justice ruled that Directive 2012/19 on waste electrical and electronic equipment is partially invalid, in so far as it obliges producers of photovoltaic panels to finance the costs relating to the management of waste from those panels where they were placed on the market on a date prior to the date on which that directive entered into force
The ECJ ruled on whether there had been an infringement and explained the conditions under which a Member State may be liable for infringement under EU Law
On whether the photovoltaic panels used by the Company constituted electrical and electronic equipment, the court confirmed that they constituted electronic equipment within the meaning of the directive. On the validity of Article 13 (1) which was applied retroactively, the court stated that the principle of legality precludes a new rule from applying to a situation established prior to its entry into force. The court stated that a new legal rule applies immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the old law, as well as new legal situation.
The court stated that since the EU legislation which existed before the WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic) directive allowed member states the option of requiring the costs of management of waste from photovoltaic panels to be borne by either current to previous waste holders or by the producer or distributor of the panels. Therefore, the provisions of Article 13(1) of the WEEE directive affecting situations that occurred before its entry into force was invalid. This is because it imposed on producers the obligation to finance the costs relating to the management of waste from photovoltaic panels placed on the market between 13 August 2005 and 13 August 2012. The court justified this decision stating that producers of photovoltaic panels were unable to foresee, when designing the panels, that they would be required in the future to provide financing of the costs relating to the management of waste from those panels.
On the issue of the law requiring users to pay contributions for management of waste being contrary to EU law, the Court held that the directive does not constitute a breach of EU law by the Czech Republic. The Court held that the achievement of the directive cannot be held to have seriously compromised the EU legal order.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
Judgment in Case C-638/19 P Commission v European Food SA and Others
Date: 25 January 2022
State aid
Facts
Appeal of the General Court judgment in Case T- 624/15 which upheld an action for annulment of the Commission’s decision (SA.38517) Concerning aid paid to Viorel and Ioan Micula and companies owned by them in the form of an arbitration award.
Judgement
The CJEU upheld the appeal, and stated that the General Court erred in law in finding that the Commission lacked competence to examine, in the light of the law on State aid, the compensation paid to Swedish investors by Romania in implementation of an arbitral award
While that award had upheld the argument of those investors that that Member State had unlawfully repealed a tax incentives scheme before its accession to the European Union, the aid measure referred to by the Commission was nevertheless granted after that accession
On whether the Commission had acquired competence to control subject to Article 108 TFEU, aid measures granted by Romania with effect from its accession to the European Union, the court held that State aids are considered granted within Article 107 (1) TFEU on the date which the right to receive it is conferred on the beneficiary under the applicable national legislation. The date is determined by the definitive right by the receivers to acquire such aid and the commitment by the giver to grant the aid. Therefore, the right to compensation for the damage for breach of the BIT was rightful, and it was granted by the arbitral award of 11 December 2013.
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)
C-118/20 Request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU
Date: 18 January 2022
Facts
An Estonian national residing in Austria, applied for Austrian nationality and was given 2years to relinquish her Estonian nationality but was subsequently refused Austrian Citizenship. In order to justify its decision, the authority stated that she no longer satisfied the conditions for grant of nationality laid down by national law because she committed two serious administrative offences, namely failing to display a vehicle inspection disc and driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Judgement
The Court ruled that, the revocation of an assurance of naturalisation must have due regard to the principle of proportionality where that revocation prevents the person concerned from recovering the citizenship of the Union. However, it is in principle for the Member State the nationality of which the person concerned applied to relinquish in order to be able to obtain the nationality of another Member State to satisfy itself that its decision in response to that application only enters into force once the new nationality has actually been acquired
Court of Justice of the European Union
Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-817/19
Ligue des droits humains v Conseil des ministres
Date: 27th January 2022
Protection of personal data — Processing of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data
According to Advocate General Pitruzella, the transfer and the generalized and undifferentiated automated processing of PNR (Passenger Name Records) data are compatible with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data
The opinion relates to whether the PNR Direction and the API Directive infringes the right to respect of life and to the protection of personal guaranteed under the Belgian and EU Law. The advocate General noted that for legislation to limit a right, the following conditions must be met: the legislation must clearly mention the limitation for it to be justified, the limitation must comply with the principle of proportionality, and the limitation must effectively meet the objectives of general interest recognized by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
On clarity of limitation, the PNR Directive does not adequately state the nature and extent of data that is to be collected. The data to be collected in found under point 12 of Annex 1 which has a heading known as “General Remarks”. However, the PNR Directives put ups proper safeguards to ensure confidentiality and safety of information by requiring air carriers to transfer only relevant, adequate, and not excessive data to PIUs. The safeguards also include only data that is expressly referred is transferred, and maintenance of security and confidentiality of data transferred.
Generally, the Advocate General notes that the PNR Directive is compliant with Articles 7 and 8 of the European Union charter and the requirement for a national supervisory authority. The directives have provided for supervision by an independent supervisory authority to verify the lawfulness of that processing, conduct investigations, inspections, and audits, and to deal with complaints lodged by any person concerned.
On whether the data collected is for the purposes of the prevention and detection of terrorist offences and serious forms of criminality, the Advocate General notes that the concept must be interpreted in accordance with the requirements of clarity and precision laid down by the Charter and in light of the purposes of the PNR Directive. He notes that the concept must only be interpreted as covering only national databases managed the competent authorities and EU and international databases, directly operated by those authorities in the course of their duties, and they must be closely related to the objectives of fighting terrorism and serious crime pursued by the PNR Directive.
On 5-year retention of data, the Advocate General notes that the data retained by the PNR directive should be permitted only to the extent of objective criteria that creates a relationship between data retention and fighting terrorism.
Court of Justice of the European Union
Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-673/20 - ONGOING CASE
EP v Préfet du Gers, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
Date: 24 February 2022
Préfet du Gers and Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
Interpretation and validity of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community – National of the United Kingdom residing in a Member State of the European Union for more than 15 years and deprived of the right to vote in the United Kingdom – Removal from the electoral list in the Member State of residence)
Can British nationals who enjoyed the benefits of Union citizenship retain those advantages following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union? This question lies at the heart of the four questions put by the Tribunal judiciaire d’Auch (Court of Auch, France) in the context of a dispute as to whether EP, a British national, continues to enjoy the rights to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections in France. The first and second questions inquire as to whether British nationals, or a subset thereof, continue to be Union citizens and enjoy the benefits of that status. If that is not the case, the third and fourth questions to the Court of Justice ask that the validity of Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community be assessed, notably in the light of the principle of proportionality.
Advocate General Collins: British nationals who enjoyed the benefits of Union citizenship do not retain those advantages following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU
The loss of those rights is one of the consequences of the sovereign decision of the UK to withdraw from the European Union.
General Court of the European Union
Case T-286/09 RENV Intel Corporation v Commission
Date: 26 January 2022
Abuse of dominant position
Facts
The European Commission imposed a fine of € 1.06 billion on Intel the microprocessor manufacturer for having abused its dominant position on the worldwide market for x86 11 processors 12 between October 2002 and December 2007, by implementing a strategy intended to exclude competitors from the market. The General court dismissed the action brought by Intel. The judgement was subsequently set aside by the Court of Justice and referred the case back to the General Court.
Judgement
By its judgment of 26 January 2022, the General Court, giving a ruling on the referral back, partially annulled the contested European Commission decision in so far as it characterises the rebates at issue as abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The court stated that ,The Commission’s analysis is incomplete and does not make it possible to establish to the requisite legal standard that the rebates at issue were capable of having, or likely to have, anticompetitive effects
The General Court annuls in part the Commission decision imposing a fine of € 1.06 billion on Intel The Commission’s analysis is incomplete and does not make it possible to establish to the requisite legal standard that the rebates at issue were capable of having, or likely to have, anticompetitive effects
General Court of the European Union (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition)
Case T‑286/09 RENV Intel Corporation Inc. v European Commission
Date: 26 January 2022
Abuse of dominant position
Facts
In 2009, the European Commission (the “Commission”) imposed a fine of €1 billion on Intel for the alleged abuse of its dominant position. The Commission found Intel to be dominant on the worldwide x86 CPU market and considered that Intel had abused this position through two practices:
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Intel paid retailers money if they only stocked computers with Intel’s x86 CPUs, and it granted hidden rebates to computer manufacturers and other customers on condition that they bought virtually all of their x86 CPUs from Intel. These practices fall in the category of (open or hidden) “rebates”.
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Intel made payments to computer manufacturers to halt or delay the launch of products containing competing x86 CGUs. These payments were not related to purchases of Intel products and therefore constituted “naked restrictions”.
The General Court upheld the Commission’s decision on appeal in 2014. The judgement was subsequently set aside by the Court of Justice in 2017 and referred the case back to the General Court.
Judgement
By its judgment of 26 January 2022, the General Court, giving a ruling on the referral back, partially annulled the contested European Commission decision in so far as it characterises the rebates at issue as abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The court stated that the Commission’s analysis is incomplete and does not make it possible to establish to the requisite legal standard that the rebates at issue were capable of having, or likely to have anticompetitive effects
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